Virtue ethics is a complicated theory. Due to its subjective nature, it is hard to pin down whether particular actions are worthy of being labelled virtuous. However, it is accepted that courage is a foundation of virtue. Unfortunately, at this junction the theory only becomes more obtuse because then one must decide what is considered courageous versus what is simply recklessness.
Aristotle had a theory dictating that “courage is a mean with regard to fear and confidence.” (Aristotle, 350 BC). Such a statement suggests that in order to be courageous, one must fear the action they are doing, but despite that do it anyway for the greater good. For instance, one may look to Martin Luther King or Gandhi who against great obstacles that ultimately became their demise, stuck to their morals and their beliefs in order to make change for the good of others.
In contrast, for someone to engage in a dangerous action but with no fear, courage is not present. The action must be trying for the individual; if it is a task they feel comfortable doing, then it is not considered courageous.
However, one must also consider the expectation for rewards. It can be considered courageous to ignore an order from a superior if it is of benefit to others. The individual would risk suffering by being defiant in order to satisfy their ideals. This can be observed through Oskar Schindler who risked his life in order to save 1,200 Jews during the Nazi regime. Aware of his limitations, he courageously took risks anyway with no desire for a reward; Schindler’s only reward was the knowledge he was saving others from a situation he deemed morally wrong. If Schindler were to expect gratification, the virtue would be null as the action would have been tainted with selfish desire.
One must not expect to benefit from the event for it to be virtuous, it must be selfless. Therefore, such an act is considered virtuous in the eyes of Aristotle.
In essence, not all of the courageous are heroic, but all heroes are courageous.
Sources:
Aristotle (350 BC) Nicomachean Ethics 3.6 translated by W.D. Ross. (1997)